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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper looks at the way in which the legal theory of the EU has evolved over the last half 
century. A major theme is the ongoing tension between continuity and change – between  EU 
legal theory as continuous with national legal theory and EU legal theory as something new 
and sui generis. With both the reductive and the productive aspects of  this tension in mind, 
the  major themes of legal theory in the EU are examined, in particular the question of the 
unity and authority of the EU legal system and the increased burden of law in the process of 
legitimating a post-state polity. 
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Legal Theory and the European Union* 
 
Neil Walker 
 
 
1. The Elusive  Novelty of EU Legal Theory 
 
What does the existing corpus of legal theory contribute to our understanding of the European 
Union? Does the European Union provide a new point of departure for legal theory, one that 
sets novel questions and requires new tools of analysis and forms of theory-building?  If this 
pair of questions frames  any inquiry into the relationship between legal theory and the EU, 
then  two  observations indicate the initial course such an inquiry should take.  The first is 
that much work either  assumes or elaborates  a positive answer to the second question – that 
the specificity of  the EU begets a  need to develop new, or at least substantially altered  tools 
for its analysis.1   The second is that, despite this,  the  existing corpus of legal theory 
continues to exert a significant, if often somewhat attenuated influence over EU legal theory.  
If we define legal theory broadly as those forms of inquiry  concerned to demonstrate  how  
some  feature or features of law in general or at least of categories (as opposed to specific 
instances) of law inform or are informed by various key matters  of  human co-existence – 
whether in  historical and social dimensions the matter of how we have and might live 
together or in the moral dimension  the matter of  how we ought to live together2 -  then what 
is immediately striking is both the modest extent to which EU legal studies  has consciously 
lifted its tools of analyses and explanatory and evaluative  schemes ‘off the shelf’ of existing 
legal theory, and the strong legacy  which existing legal theory has nevertheless provided. 
If we begin with the first proposition – the assumption or conviction that the EU needs 
and possesses its own  tools of analysis, there are two overlapping sets of reasons for this. A 
significant  part of the explanation lies in a relatively uncontroversial and, indeed,  familiar 
story of the legal academy, one which consigns theoretical inquiry to a secondary and largely 
parasitic role.  European supranational law remains a relatively recent phenomenon, hardly 50 
years old,3 yet it is an area of law which has expanded and continues to expand exponentially. 
Both  factors are important.  Like any new branch of law, EU law and its precursors4 
generated from the outset a corresponding body of doctrinal analysis in the legal academic 
                                                          
* A version of this article is forthcoming in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, No4, 2005. 
1
 A similar, and, as we shall see, connected story may be told of other disciplines such as political theory. See 
e.g., H. Friese and P. Wagner, “Survey Article: The Nascent Political  Philosophy of the European Polity” 
(2002) 10 The Journal of Political Philosophy, 342.  
2
 The definition is intentionally wide, meant to cover work by those in other disciplines who take law seriously 
as an object of analysis as well as work within ‘legal theory’ as pursued in law departments or faculties. Since 
there is much cross-fertilization between law and other social scientific disciplines in EU studies, a more narrow 
definition would be artificially restrictive - a point variously illustrated in Part 2 below.  
3
 The EEC Treaty (Treaty of Rome) of 1957 is sometimes treated as the starting point, as is the earlier (1951) 
ECSC Treaty (Treaty of Paris).  
4
 Strictly speaking, unless and until the ratification of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, the EU, introduced under 
the TEU at Maastricht in 1991,  remains a separate treaty alongside the EC (successor to EEC) and other Treaty 
systems, but the academic practice of describing the legal whole as the EU is now settled.  
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world of the various member states.5 This new branch of doctrinal analysis tended to 
be pursued at the institutional level by  academic lawyers versed in international or 
constitutional law and at the substantive level by  academic lawyers versed in those areas of 
domestic substantive law of most direct relevance to the original market-making and anti-
trust themes of EC law. As in other areas of legal education, which across all European 
jurisdictions remains greatly influenced by the demands of professional training and the 
production and dissemination of  practical  legal knowledge, the main task and first priority of 
these pioneers was one of exposition and textual analysis, and of the classification and 
ordering of legal materials in terms of the utility value of such schemes to the aspiring 
practitioner. Given the remorseless pace of  development of the  acquis comunautaire,6 there 
has been no subsequent magic moment of doctrinal consolidation  to follow the institutional 
innovations of the foundational phase. Rather,  doctrinal analysis  has strained to keep up 
with the flow of new law, and, not unsurprisingly,  the effort required has  restricted broad-
ranging theoretical  reflection to modest proportions.  
This is reinforced by two more distinctive  features of the academic division of labour 
in EU legal studies. First, with the progressive   embedding of EU law in domestic systems 
and its expansion into ever new areas, including in recent years environmental law, public 
health law and criminal law and procedure, doctrinal analysis has also to some extent been 
'redomiciled' in its relevant substantive disciplines.7 Secondly, there remain as many versions 
of EU law as there are member states. This is not simply a legal-cultural imperative, or even a 
linguistic imperative,8 but, perhaps even more  significantly,  a systemic imperative. For all 
the endless controversy about the precise terms on which EU law is received into national law, 
and the exact import of doctrines such as direct effect and supremacy,9  the intensity of 
normative interlocking of EU law with national legal orders is in all cases and on all possible 
interpretations far  greater than in the case of any previous merely ‘international’ as opposed 
to ‘supranational’  legal regime. The  study of EU law at the point of  national reception 
perforce becomes the study of a distinctive legal hybrid – a European law immediately 
contextualized and transformed by the distinctive normative order in which it is articulated.  
Both of these axes of difference – sectoral and national – militate against the idea of 
EU law as a singular object of knowledge ripe for integrated theoretical treatment.10  Rather, 
                                                          
5
 See e.g., A, Von Bogdandy, “A Bird’s Eye View on the Science of European Law: Structures, Debates and 
Development Prospects of Basic Research on the Law of the European Union in a German Perspective (2000) 6 
ELJ, 208; J. Shaw, “The European Union: Discipline Building Meets Polity Building,” in P. Cane and M. 
Tushnet (eds) Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (2003) 326-352. 
6
 Even if the production of primary legislation peaked in  the early 1990s with the completion of the Single 
Market Programme, this has been more than compensated for in the expansion of secondary rule-making and 
other forms of bureaucratic governance. See R. Dehousse, “Beyond representative democracy: constitutionalism 
in a polycentric polity” In J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 
(2003) , 135-156. 
7
  There is a clear analogy here with the trend in political science towards sectoral ‘governance’ studies in which 
the shape and existence of the European polity is increasingly treated as the taken-for-granted “independent 
variable.” See M. Jachtenfuchs, “The Governance Approach to European Integration” (2001) 39 JCMS 245.  
8
 Indeed, as English has consolidated its position as  ‘first second language’ in most parts of the EU, the purely 
technical barrier that language poses to the development of a homogenous body of learning is less profound than 
it was, although any common monolingual intellectual discourse obviously remains highly circumscribed as 
regards both participants and objects of study. See e.g.  Von Bogdandy, Shaw, n5 above on the reasons for and 
limitations of English ascendancy.   
9
  See e.g., B. De Witte, “Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order,” in P. Craig and G de 
Burca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (1999). 
10
  In the case of national distinctiveness, this may be reinforced by the staggered reception of  European law  
across five waves of enlargement, with the initial six now increased to twenty five, and the UK  acceding as part 
of the first wave in 1973.  As  all  academic national constituencies now affected by EU law did not undertake 
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they accentuate a tendency towards a reactive, event-driven and context-dependent approach 
to EU legal studies. On this view, even when theoretical concerns surface on a crowded 
academic agenda, they often tend to be shaped by highly specific, infra-systemic  
developments and thus to highlight the peculiarity of EU ‘legal problems’ rather than their 
continuity with problems which have stimulated theoretical reflection before or elsewhere. 
Three examples from recent years, taken  from different level of the EU legal order – 
substantive, structural and institutional - serve to illustrate  that tendency.  
At the level of  substantive legal doctrine, the jurisprudence of human rights is a case 
in point. While the arrival of a declaratory Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2001 may  in 
time change  the approach of European lawyers,11 what is striking about the study of  human 
rights development from the early initiatives of the ECJ from the late 1960s  onwards,12 is the 
extent to which it has failed to  resonate with the typical concerns of theoretically oriented 
human rights lawyers working in other contexts. The abiding preoccupation in the EU context  
has not been with the classic questions of constitutional theory – the relationship between 
rights and democracy, or of international law theory – the tension between universalism and 
the recognition of the diversity of local conditions and requirements, or with other central 
concerns of rights-based normative legal theory such as the relative priority of negative first 
generation and positive second and third generation rights, or the definition of the core and 
basic purpose of particular nights individually and inter se. Rather, the concern of EU lawyers  
has been with  how rights discourse contributes to an understanding of the relationship in 
terms of formal competence, practical efficacy and relative legitimacy between the new 
supranational order on the one hand and other overlapping legal orders on the other -  whether 
they be  nationally or, in the case of the Council of Europe’s rights catalogue, internationally 
located.13 More recent developments too, such as the growing interest in the mainstreaming 
of human rights within the legal order as a whole,14 have continued to find analytical focus in 
the highly specific character of   EU law, and in particular in the  onus on the EU as a form of 
public power whose mechanism of individual and collective accountability have long been 
criticized as underdeveloped  to  remedy its rights deficit and to promote rights internally and 
externally in accordance with consistent standards. The most universal of legal discourses, in 
other words,  has been analyzed primarily  for its contribution to a very particular series of 
‘turf wars,’ or insofar as inquiry has been concerned with normative development for its own 
sake, this has remained  very closely informed by the institutional distinctiveness of the EU 
legal order. 
At the level of structural principles, ‘subsidiarity’ provides an equally  good example 
of introspection. Developed to address, or at least to capture the tension between the demands 
of decision-making economies of scale on the one hand and the concerns for the protection of 
national diversity on the other at the time of the Maastricht Treaty,15 the subsequent career of 
this concept in EU studies is testament to the context- and practice-dependence of EU 
theorizing in at least two senses. First, there has been much concern with how to 
operationalize  what was and remains an unpromisingly vague candidate for legal application 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
their intellectual journeys simultaneously, this increases  the likelihood of these journeys taking rather different 
courses. 
11
 [2000] OJC364/1 
12
 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491. 
13
 As the treatment of fundamental rights in all the major EU law textbooks indicates. 
14
  See e.g. P. Alston and J.H.H. Weiler, “An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The 
European Union and Human Rights” in P. Alston (ed)  The EU ad Human Rights  (1999)  3-68.  
15
 Art.3b(now 5) EC. 
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by the political institutions of the EU, still less for recognition as justiciable before the ECJ.16 
Secondly, though the concept may seem to bear a family resemblance to notions such as 
federalism, or devolution, or, more abstractly, decentralization,  and thus to the question of 
the theorization of multi-centred authority within legal and political systems generally, the fit 
remains an awkward one, not least because the background concerns in response to which the 
‘subsidiarity’ concept was developed and the broader institutional setting in which it is 
located  are quite different from the paradigm state-based  contexts of federalism or 
devolution.17  
At the level of institutional design, a similar story can be told of the so-called New 
Modes of Governance, and in particular the recent intense interest in the Open Method of Co-
ordination as a means of replacing or supplementing in certain policy areas the traditional 
command-and-control Community method of Commission proposal and parliamentary and 
Council disposal of legislation with a  novel decision-making structure based on standard 
setting, voluntary national compliance and mutual learning.18  Again there are interesting 
analogies in the internal administrative orders of member states, and in particular in the 
development of New Public Management methodologies which mark a trend away from the 
conception of centrally  institutionalized administrative steering  tied to a holistic conception 
of the public interest, but various distinctive features of the EU problematique – including the 
restrictions imposed by limited EU competence and the dispersed transnational framework 
for establishing standards and engineering compliance mean that the theoretical centre of 
gravity of such inquiry tends to be located elsewhere. The key comparators for purposes of 
evaluation in terms of norms of good governance are more likely to be other older  forms of 
transnational governance, rather than  prototypes or parallels in national or other jurisdictions. 
The focus tends to be on internal transformation – what  EU law can learn from its past 
shortcomings or from changes its own jurisgenerative possibilities and policy challenges, 
rather than from the widest circumstances of administrative law and from administrative law 
theory  more generally.19 
These examples do more than demonstrate the simple fact of a branch of legal study 
responding to data overload by  trimming its theoretical ambitions, or even the 
understandable emphasis, familiar from other branches of legal science, towards middle-
range theorizing – the explanation or evaluation of internal features of the system in terms of 
the  system itself. They also point to a second and  deeper set of reasons  why the theoretical 
concerns of EU law are assumed by its students to  grow out of disciplinary concerns rather 
than frame them in advance. Simply put,  this has to do with a fairly widespread  belief or 
intuition as to the sui generis20 quality of the EU legal order, and a  sense that  there is not 
much to be gained, and perhaps more to be distorted, by  applying tools honed in other fields 
of inquiry, whether of domestic legal orders or international legal orders,  to the “new legal 
                                                          
16
 See e.g. G. de Burca, ‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam’ Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper, no. 7/1999. 
17
 Although see, e.g.,   C. Coglianese and K. Nicolaides, “Securing Subsidiarity: The Institutional Design of 
Federalism in the United States and Europe” in K. Nicolaides and R. Howse (eds)  The Federal Vision: 
Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (2001) 277-99; N. Barber, 
“The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity” (2005) 11 ELJ 308. 
18
  See e.g. J. Scott and D.Trubek, :Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European 
Union” (2002) 8 ELJ 1; G. De Burca, “The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European 
Union,” (2003) 28 ELR 814. 
19
  But see e.g., C. Scott,  “The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-Level Control” 
(2002)8 ELJ  59. 
20
  See e.g.  A. Verhoeven,  “The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory” Parts I 
and II.  
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order”21 of supranationalism. That is to say it is not – or not necessarily – a  modesty of 
ambition born of practical constraints or of an unduly  parochial sense of relevance that leads 
even the more theoretically inclined students of EU law to treat the EU system as their 
exclusive or key reference point when pondering various infra-systemic concerns, but a 
conviction that the EU even conceived of at its overall systemic level  is in a class of one, and 
that methodologies which look for or assume like  cases  are as likely to mislead  as to 
enlighten,  as apt to divert as to focus understanding. 
What explains this belief?  In part, we may look to social and historical context. Many 
of the early converts to the European idea in the legal academy and in the institutions 
themselves – and here we should note the influence of key figures who cross over or retain a 
foot in both camps22 - embraced their  subject with something approaching a missionary  
zeal.23 EU law was special first and foremost because the European supranational project was 
an indisputably good cause,  a triumph of  rationality over the passions, of common interest 
over national insularity, and perhaps most seductively for the legal academic, of law over 
politics. Less nobly, the claim to ‘specialness’ may have been associated with the  
competition for scarce  symbolic capital that professional specialization in the academy 
always brings. A sense of the distinctive, and, for other than the long initiated and well 
practiced, inaccessible complexity of the EU legal structure and dynamics,  as well perhaps as 
a feeling for the unusual centrality of law in the task of supranational polity-building,24  
encouraged some to view or project themselves as members of a highly select community of 
knowledge.25 Yet, whatever and however noble its roots,  faith is never particularly conducive 
to a spirit of sceptical inquiry and to a mode or scale of  theoretical reflection  that might 
undermine its founding certainties.   
But it would be unfair to set too much store by the image of the ‘oversocialized’ 
academic. We must avoid reductionism and quickly acknowledge that in response to 
precisely the same sense of novelty of the EU system viewed in holistic terms,  in many 
corners of the  European legal academy, and, importantly, also in more theoretically 
predisposed disciplines where law was identified as an important aspect of European 
integration and thus as a fruitful subject of inquiry,26  there did develop a practice and culture 
of theoretical reflection on European law.27 One  of the fruits of this has been  a series of 
insights which provides a more articulate grounding for the doctrinalist’s inchoate sense of 
the distinctive  quality of EU law.  The gist of the message was that if the EU, at least on 
most readings, had quickly outgrown its origins as a purely international legal order without 
making  the quantum leap to statehood, then theoretical work which suggested otherwise, 
whose articulate or inarticulate basic premises were of the EU as something that can be 
compared to a traditional international order or to a state for purposes of explanation or 
                                                          
21
 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] ECR 1, at 12 
22
  See e.g., Von Bogdandy, n5 above, 212. 
23
 J. Shaw,  “European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic” (1996) 16 OJLS 231.  
24
  See section 2(b) below. 
25
  See Shaw, above n23, esp. 234-8. 
26
  Se section 2(b) below. 
27
  An important early English language work was F. Snyder, “New Directions in European Community Law,” 
(1987) 14  Journal of Law and Society 167. See also J. Shaw and G. More (eds) New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union (1995). The development of new journals and of new editorial policies in existing journals has 
also been an important influence upon and indictor of a more theoretical turn; for example, the launching of the 
European Law Journal in 1995 – explicitly committed to a law-in-context approach, the support of the OJLS for 
theoretical study of EU law - especially in its review section, and the recent development of a more theoretical 
orientation in the European Law Review.  
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evaluation or at least can be see as one species of a universal ‘polity’ genus, must be viewed 
as fundamentally misconceived – as making a basic “category error.”28 
Yet, for all that it is at the level of the theorization of the whole that one is most likely 
to meet the self-conscious assertion of  the need for EU legal studies to distance itself  from 
the traditional premises and  forms of legal theory, it is also precisely at  the higher range 
system or polity level that  EU legal theory encounters most difficulty in escaping the shadow 
of  these traditions. The  basic explanation of this is one of epistemic limits. For once we 
reach the level of the polity itself, the sorts of theoretical questions that face EU law, whether 
the range of explanatory questions around the (dis)unity  of EU law or the explanation of the 
emergence and continued vitality of the EU order qua legal order, or the spectrum of 
evaluative and practical questions around the best justification, proper ambitions and 
expedient limits  of EU law, cannot but draw upon an arsenal of concepts and theoretical 
mechanisms developed or refined in an older context in which the national and the 
international, with the  former dominating,  were the two sides and the key frames of the 
world order of states. In the nice  phrase of Shaw and Wiener, “the often invisible  touch of 
stateness”29 is apt to compromise the understanding of post-state entities such as the EU.  
Under the sign of  “methodological nationalism,” 30   the  state template remains the 
inescapable starting point for our reflections on why law is resorted to or how it coheres, as 
well as for the standards of, or deficits of “ democracy, legitimacy, accountability, 
equality,…security”31 and the like on the basis of which  we  seek to evaluate it. 
The persistence of -  and the persistent controversy over,  the statist legacy, and to a 
lesser extent the internationalist legacy, and the problem of epistemic limits to which it 
speaks,  is further compounded by what we might call the politics of EU jurisprudence. The 
inclination to account for or evaluate the system as a whole may  lead to meta-reflections on 
the  “problem of translation,”32  but  it is  also bound up with different hopes and fears about 
the proper or likely trajectory of supranationalism. Adoption  of  certain theoretical premises, 
whether state-centred or international-centred or sui generic, may not be entirely politically 
innocent. This is as likely to lead to entrenchment of different positions, and indeed - as these 
large political questions resonate across all  the human sciences - to the forming of  various  
cross-disciplinary or inter-disciplinary theoretical alliances and oppositions,33  as it is to the  
search for a common theoretical language within EU legal studies. For example, the 
promotion of a state-centred  explanatory  apparatus and developmental model may legitimate 
the view of the EU as a proto-state entity with state-like aspirations, or it may  dramatize the 
implausibility and illegitimacy of such an ambition  – most notably in the increasingly 
clamorous debate over EU constitutionalism.34 Conversely, to hold the EU to certain state-
like standards, as in the democratic deficit debate which is today as prevalent in law as in 
                                                          
28
  G. Majone, The Dilemmas of European Integration (2005)  21.  
29
 J. Shaw and A. Wiener, “The Paradox of the European Polity” in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds) State 
of the European Union 5: Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival(2000). 
30
 
30
 M. Zurn, “On the Conceptualization of Postnational Politics: The Limits of Methodological Nationalism.” 
Paper presented to Workshop on Global Governance, Robert Schuman Centre, Florence, April 2001. 
31
 Shaw and Wiener, above n29. 
32
  J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (1999) 270; see also  N. Walker,  Postnational Constitutionalism 
and the Problem of Translation” In Weiler and Wind (eds) 27-54.  
33
  Perhaps the best-known of which is the original, and tenacious, opposition between neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. See e.g.  P. Craig, “The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy and 
Legitimacy” in Craig and De Burca (eds) 1-54. 
34
  See section 2(b) below. 
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political science circles,35    may be  an effective, even  convenient means to dramatize its 
deficiencies, just as criticism of the use of a state benchmark may be a convenient way of  
avoiding such judgment. Or. to revert to the other side of the Westphalian coin, to begin from 
the premise that the EU is merely an elaborately tailored international model, to be viewed in 
terms of  realist or intergovernmentalist assumptions36 or in terms of state delegation theory,37 
may amount to a self-vindicating narrowing of the horizons of what is conceivable in 
transnational law and politics, just as the criticism of  this strain of traditional theorizing may  
conveniently gloss over many pertinent observations on the limits of the transformative 
potential of the EU. For their part, as they tend to be  the critics of both internationalist and 
quasi-statist readings of the EU, those who advocate a sui generic third way are not  immune 
from the charge of  convenient dismissal of inconvenient criticism.  
And while these various theoretical commitments and strategies  help to  keep the 
question of epistemic limits on the agenda, this is often  in a somewhat negative register. The 
old tends to be criticized in terms of the mere possibility and claimed desirability of the new, 
and, conversely, the new may, with some justification,  be dismissed by partisans of evolution 
rather than revolution  for its unproductive navel-gazing tendencies, for merely repeating the 
mantra of theoretical innovation rather than putting it into practice. 38  
2. The Dynamics of EU Legal Theory 
This is by no means  to suggest, however, that at the systemic level EU legal theorizing is 
trapped in  epistemic limbo, unable to move backwards or forwards, or that it is merely 
politics dressed up as theory. It appears to be an abiding feature of the attainment of 
theoretical self-consciousness in the human sciences at least, given the diverse value 
commitments of the ‘scientists’ and the limited scrutability of their object of study, that any 
aspiringly encompassing discourse it generates feeds a sense of its  own impotence, of 
endless and  circular contestability. Yet if we take a more ‘bottom-up’ approach, and  one 
which is problem-centred rather than discipline-centred,  and so embrace the inevitability of 
diversity ‘all the way up’ from methodological premises or presupposition through 
substantive theory-building to propositional outcomes, then we observe a different picture. 
For in a fundamental sense,   like EU studies across the social sciences generally, EU legal 
studies  even in its relatively mature doctrinal and disciplinary phase remains event-sensitive,  
with the sheer pace and variety of such events continually throwing up new problems and 
puzzles  for those concerned with the EU law at the overall systemic level as much as for 
those concerned with particular sectoral developments. Engagement with these new problems, 
through diverse combination of old and new concepts and techniques, has been the occasion 
for much unapologetic innovation, not least because, at the legal systemic level as much as at 
the infra-systemic level, the  recognition of the pressing nature of the practical concerns these 
problems announce ( the inevitable accompaniment of which recognition is a particular and 
partial  ‘political’ predisposition, however latent)  provides a motivating factor which 
overrides, or at least postpones meta-theoretical angst.  
                                                          
35
  See e.g. P Craig and C. Harlow, (ed) Law Making in the European Union (1998); C. Harlow, Accountability 
in the European Union (2002);  M. Everson, “Accountability and Law in Europe: Towards a New Public Legal 
Order? (2004) 67 MLR 124. 
36
  See e.g. A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(1998). 
37
 See e.g., P. Lindseth, “Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing the Democratic Disconnect in 
the European Market-Polity”  in“ C. Joerges and R. Dehousse, (eds) Good Governance in Europe's Integrated 
Market  (2002). 
38
  See e.g.,  Verhoeven above n20, esp. Pts I-III. 
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Perhaps the best way of identifying some of the key areas of bottom-up   theoretical 
concern and  innovation, is to start,  from an intuitive but widely shared ‘pre-theoretical’ 
sense of  problem-relevance, and trace how this leads to particular and diversely developed 
theoretical insights about the novelty or otherwise of the functions and uses of law in the 
supranational order -  at which point, if often in subtly nuanced ways, the fault-lines between 
old and newer conceptual supports and frames of inquiry tend to re-emerge. A useful point of 
departure for these purposes remains the oft-quoted insight of Dehousse and Weiler that in 
the supranational context law is “both the object and agent of integration.” 39  This 
immediately indicates two types of innovative theoretical challenge. First, as the object, law 
itself provides one relatively autonomous candidate domain of integration alongside those of 
politics, economics, culture etc, and, accordingly, the theoretical study of the problems of 
legal integration thus discretely conceived tends to be the province of those whose theoretical 
training and  primary  “knowledge-constitutive interests”40 tend  to be law-centred. On the 
one hand, as we have already noted, the degree of interpenetration of national and European  
legal orders implied by supranationalism means that the ways in which we normally conceive 
of the relationship between adjacent but presumptively separate legal orders, whether through 
the episodic ‘conflicts’  of private international law or the competing singular formulae for 
linking  public international law to national law  (monism versus dualism)41 are inadequate to 
grasp the dense complexity of the relevant ties. On the other hand, the usual candidate 
solution  where legal orders pass a certain threshold of density in their relations, whether 
through  their fusion without remainder or the absorption or colonization of one by the other, 
namely the idea of a single monopolistic sovereign authority – does not seem adequate either. 
How, then, is this new kind of relationship, this new form of authority and coherence, best to 
be  conceptualized? 
Secondly, as the agent of integration, an even broader set of new challenges and 
opportunities are presented to law. Here, as first comprehensively portrayed by the 
‘integration through law’ school  of the 1980s, 42  law is posited as the “independent 
variable”43 accounting for or influencing a number of other key dimensions of the integration 
process.  What makes this more than the familiar legocentric tendency  of the doctrinalist – 
and, indeed, an area of study which, unlike the ‘law as object’ literature attracts considerable 
interest from the other disciplines -   are a number of peculiar features of the European project 
which do indeed suggest a special, and if taken together, perhaps unique prominence for law 
in the making and sustaining of a polity. First, there is the absence of the kinds of cultural 
supports that we normally associate both with the production of and compliance with law in a 
national or otherwise more  cohesive polity, and the extra demands this places on law both in 
its self-legitimation and in the legitimation of the polity whole.44 Secondly, and related, there 
is the relative fragmentation, fragility and volatility of the political dimension in the making 
of the European polity, and the compensatory pressures this places on law. Thirdly, there is 
the  peculiarly ‘scripted’ nature of the EU polity.45 Unlike a state,  the EU does not possess 
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theoretically unlimited competence to deal with all and any of the affairs of its citizens. It is 
restricted to certain purposes, however broadly these be prescribed. As well, as being a 
normatively incomplete polity, however,  the EU is also normatively open-ended, in that 
unlike a classical international order, it is not presumptively confined to a determinate range 
of objectives. 46  Rather, its history, the range and depth of its  mechanisms for norm-
generation, and the unprecedented (short of the state)  extent to which its actions have 
become embedded in a web of mutual expectations and commitments with citizens, civil 
society and other levels of government  suggest that it has an  as yet “unsaturated”47 political 
and legal capacity, and, moreover,  that the exploitation of this latent potential is peculiarly 
amenable to conscious design. The legal script, therefore, remains a key token and compass 
of progress, its drama of shifting purposes, values and ideals both an eloquent  reflection of 
and an attempt to shape a narrative which is typically understood as complete  in the legal 
order of a state and as less fluid in the legal order of an international organization. Fourthly, 
and to some extent as a corrective to the third point, the centrality of law also has to do with 
the fact that the EU is a polity in progress not only in normative terms but also in social terms. 
What makes law central, namely the weakness of its cultural supports and political steering 
mechanisms, also makes law precarious. What makes law a window of change and a key to 
innovation, namely the unfinished  and shifting nature of the European journey, 48  also 
exposes law to overreach and disappointment.49  More generally, the simple fact that the EU 
and EU law are works in progress has profound methodological implications. We lack both 
the confidence and the  knowledge of retrospective wisdom.  Not only are we faced with a 
situation in  which law is asked to contribute perhaps in unprecedented ways to the making of 
a political community, but we  do not how far or for how long it will succeed. We ask new 
questions of law’s role in mobilizing and co-ordinating collective action without the luxury of 
knowing that it has already answered these questions elsewhere, thereby underscoring our 
uncertainty as to whether it  can answer these questions. 
Let us now, in the concluding sections of this essay, offer some schematic thoughts on 
how EU legal theory has developed research paradigms in response to these two clusters of 
problems – the authority and unity of a species of law whose internal code has conventionally 
been viewed as one of  integration on the one hand, and the special challenge of law’s 
contribution to integration more broadly conceived on the other. 
(i) The authority and unity of EU law  
If  neither the traditional statist language of sovereignty nor the old language of international 
law is adequate fully to capture the complexity of  the EU legal order, what theoretical tools, 
if any,  are better equipped for the task?  As noted above, these questions have tended to be 
thrown up or sharpened by events,  and the development of two overlapping areas of 
contestation and theoretical innovation should be seen in this light. The first, as already noted, 
concerns the relationship between the EU and the member states, a debate initially fed by the 
ECJ’s early claim to systemic autonomy and supremacy and  by occasional national judicial 
reactions to this,50 and subsequently more fully nourished by post-Maastricht controversies, 
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spreading to the political institutions and to public sites of debate,  about the outer boundaries 
of an expanding EU and the   strength and plausibility of the claim  of states to continue to 
control or influence these boundaries.51  A second issue, which also gained much momentum 
from Maastricht, and its introduction both of  a new depth of “structural variability” in the 
form of the Three Pillar architecture  of core EC law,  Justice and Home Affairs and Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, and   of new and significant forms of  “jurisdictional 
variability”52 in terms of a shift from the default presumption of  unanimous and uniform 
member state involvement in areas such as Economic and Monetary Union and the Social 
Policy Protocol,53 concerns the internal coherence of the EU order. In the light of these 
developments,  were we not moving towards a more variegated legal architecture, and, if so,  
did the idea of ‘differentiated integration’ not pose an  oxymoronic challenge to the very idea 
of unitary legal order? 54 
  Both  questions, that of inter-systemic coherence as well as that of intra-systemic 
coherence,  clearly cast doubt on the  plausibility of a traditional Kelsenian  or Hartian notion 
of  a legal order as a hierarchical structure of norms  organized around a  point of legally self-
validating sovereignty assumed or claimed to be grounded in  social or political authority. 
The theoretical response has been notably diverse.  Aside  from those who remain convinced 
that the  old state sovereigntist  understanding has no plausible rivals in meeting the new 
challenge,55 some have sought to adapt  the old concepts to the new, while others have sought 
to declare the old redundant. 
Within the adaptation  category, one body of work has endeavoured  to retain the old 
idea of sovereign authority but to relocate it in a plural framework.56 The hypothesis of a 
plurality of sovereign unities argues that the self-understanding of the diverse legal orders - 
both the various national orders and the EU order itself -  situated in the supranational 
configuration remains tied to a sovereigntist logic, one in which final authority is always self-
referential and self-determined, and that the coherence of the whole is always precarious  and 
derivative - dependent upon the various bridging mechanism established between the 
different legal and political institutions of these diverse sites of sovereign authority and their 
capacity for  harmonious mutual adjustment. On this view, there can be no final ‘authority of 
authorities,’ – no ubersovereign of the various sovereigns, and the point at which the various 
sovereign law-givers are unable to achieve normative convergence on the basis of their 
different validity claims is also the point at which we run out of legal solutions. The question 
of coherence then become one of whether and how the clash of final authorities can be 
deferred, and even if this can be done indefinitely, the integrity  of the whole necessarily 
remains a contingent achievement rather than a normative premise  or guarantee. 
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Another adaptation strategy is simultaneously less and more radical. It is less radical 
to the extent that unlike the pluralist approach, it seeks to  retain the idea of  the unity of the 
whole, even if it allows it a complex internal quality. Owing much to   German and Dutch 
scholarship,57   this approach often cuts across  questions of external (with state orders) and 
internal coherence in seeking to reconcile the idea of a poly-centred structure of political 
authority with the regulatory ideal  of an encompassing EU-wide or  EU-and-state wide legal 
unity. This distinction indicates the sense in which the complex unity approach  it is also 
more  radical than the pluralist approach, in that  it implies a downgrading of the importance 
of sovereignty, as the latter has  traditionally implied the coincidence and mutual 
reinforcement of legal and political authority. To the extent that sovereignty remain in the 
conceptual frame, it appears  as something no longer holistic and indivisible but now as 
composite and capable of disaggregation, as in the language of pooled, shared, divided split 
or partial sovereignty.58 In its place,  other ‘sovereign independent’ aspects of the idea of 
legal order are required to do much of the work of securing the necessary unity. As  pursued  
in the following subsection, this may take the form of  some claimed  special quality or 
contingent advantage of law pertinent to the ends of integration and the teleology of 
supranationalism. Alternatively or additionally, it may invoke an old if newly contextualized 
universal, as in the idea of “multi-level constitutionalism”59 – the notion  that the EU is just 
one of many entangled and interwoven sites at which an increasingly universal or 
universalizable idea of constitutional principle provides the common steering mechanism and 
integrating ingredient for the whole. 
If the pluralists retain sovereignty at the price of guaranteed  unity, and the complex 
unitarians retain unity at the price of the  relegation of sovereignty to minor and divisible key,  
another set of strategies seeks a more radical break from the sovereignty idea. Here again, 
however, we can identify two variations on the abolitionist or post-sovereign theme. One 
such approach seeks to retain the notion of unity and coherence, however complex, while the 
other is committed to the maintenance neither of sovereignty nor of  a traditional idea of unity 
and coherence. The first post-sovereign approach, of which Neil MaCormick is an influential 
exponent,60 remains closely related to the complex unitarian approach but presses  harder in 
its efforts to move beyond sovereignty. On this view, law, conceived of generically as 
institutional or rule-based normative order, is not and was never conceptually tied to the state, 
and indeed the state is not and was never conceptually tied to a notion of indivisible 
sovereignty, even if there was a strong historical coincidence in the Westphalian world of the 
law-state.61 The search for a harmony of legal relations within the European  polity, therefore,  
need not start from the premise that the ‘sovereignty ingredient’ need be replaced or 
supplemented by a new ‘x’ factor, but from the appreciation that sovereignty was only ever 
one form of underpinning of the ‘institutional’ dimension  of institutional normative order, 
and that its fading currency should be seen as a matter of (happy) political circumstance 
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rather than conceptual crisis62. To be sure, the strength of historical path-dependence upon 
state-sovereigntist forms of institutional normative order means that political imagination  
and political will is still required to bring about the necessary transformation to a more 
heterarchical system of authority and to fill the void left by sovereignty’s departure. Yet this 
should not be thought of, as with the pluralists, as a necessarily self-defeating pursuit of ‘law 
beyond law’, but rather as the exploitation of the more general resources of the flexible 
human invention of institutional normative order beyond one of its  particular state-centred 
manifestations.63         
The other post-sovereigntist  approach  is more difficult to capture, precisely because 
it tends to start from the premise that neither sovereignty, nor its close historical-conceptual 
cousin, the idea of  unity, is a key or even a  desirable aspect of  law, and so does  not seek 
common terms of debate  with the positions set out above. For example, in one influential 
version, the traditional preoccupation with sovereignty and unity is seen not so much as an 
epistemic challenge – as a way of viewing the world which may have become encrusted with 
outmoded assumptions but which still refers us to key prerequisites of  collective legal and 
political capacity, but as an ideological barrier to be struck down –  the  legacy of a  harmful 
obsession with the practice of “personification”64 in constitutional thinking  which treats the 
boundaries of the sovereign (or even post-sovereign) polity as the boundaries of political 
initiative and legal norm-generation, and is so doing permits  dominant  particular interests to 
masquerade as the general will. Instead, a new commitment to a bottom-up democratic 
experimentalism should be encouraged – one in which coherence is not a matter of the 
backward-looking fit of particular legal applications with a fixed system of norms, but of 
forward-looking mutual learning and synergy between different problem-solving micro-
communities in which the norm-application distinction dissolves in a process of continuous 
reflection, adaptation and renegotiation.65 The lack of a clear sovereigntist default structure of 
authority in the EU, in this view, is not a problem so much as an opportunity and occasion for 
a  radically differentiated  juridical framework to take hold.  
What is implicit, and in some cases explicit, in all of these perspectives, and is also 
evident from their more or less radical incompatibility,  is the impossibility of  cordoning off 
questions of authority and coherence – the inner morality or structural integrity of law – from 
wider practical  questions of what law might or should become in the EU.  For in the final 
analysis, whether, to what extent  and in what ways sovereignty and  unity remain important 
and viable features of the supranational legal constellation are inseparable from the question 
of what model or models of law’s European future are possible or desirable. This points us 
directly towards our  final area of  analysis. 
(ii) Law’s European sonderweg66  and the constitutional (re)turn 
Even more so than the study of the authority and coherence of EU law,  the study of the 
special contribution of law to the making of a new type of polity has intensified in recent 
years, with much of it revolving around the current constitutional debate. We cannot 
appreciate this impulse however, without exploring some of the important theoretical 
innovations and insights of earlier phases. Again, German scholarship provided a particularly 
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fertile environment. What is remarkable about much of this work is its refusal to treat the 
original features of the supranational entity, in particular the lack of  the robust social, 
political and cultural supports of the nation state,  as  leading to intractable legitimacy 
problems, but rather, first, to find in some special characteristic of law the way to  quite 
distinctively ‘third way’ solutions, and secondly,  in so doing to turn the source of the 
supposed ‘problem’ of legitimacy into the key to its solution. In their very different ways,  for 
instance, both the ordoliberal tradition67 and Hans Ipsen’s idea of the EU as a special purpose 
association68  saw supranational law as engaged in activities which could and should be 
shielded from direct political interference. For the ordoliberals,  The Treaty of Rome supplied 
Europe with its own  economic constitution,  a supranational  market–enhancing system of 
rights  whose legitimacy depended precisely on the absence of  democratically responsive 
will formation and consequential pressure towards market-interfering socio-economic 
legislation at the supranational level , a matter which should instead be left to the member 
states - and even there only insofar as compatible with the bedrock economic constitution. 
Ipsen’s theory, to which Majone’s work on the idea of a European “regulatory state”69 is a 
notable successor, shares with ordoliberalism the idea that supranationalism transcends 
partisan politics, but here the invisible hand of the market is supplemented by the expert hand 
of the technocrat. The scope of European law is not restricted to negative integration – to the 
market-making removal of obstacles to wealth-enhancing free trade, but also extends to 
certain positive measures of an administrative nature. In Majone’s elaborately developed 
model,  these regulatory measures are concerned not with macro-politically sensitive 
questions of distribution, but with risk-regulation in matters such as product  and 
environmental standards where expert knowledge is paramount, and where accountability is 
best served by administrative law measures aimed at transparency and enhanced participation 
in decision-making by interested and knowledgeable parties rather than the volatile 
preferences  of broad representative institutions. 
If these approaches emphasize  law as a  social technology with characteristics 
peculiarly suited to supranationalism, whether as a  form of rights-insulation and guarantor of 
predictability and calculability in  market relations, or as a tool for developing and refining 
forms of governance which counteract rather than track  received models  of broad 
representative government, other  early narratives of law’s  contribution to supranationalism 
are less essentialist in nature. Instead they stress a looser  affinity  between the dynamic of 
law and of integration more generally, or are inclined to emphasize the situational character 
of law’s prominence. 
 In the first category, we can place accounts of law which rely implicitly or explicitly 
upon neo-functionalist  premises, or indeed upon other political science approaches which 
stress the broad institutional effects of law and the instrumental strategies of legal actors over 
detailed inquiry into its internal normative structure and reasoning.70 Neo-functionalism, of 
course, is famous for its early pre-eminence in the general theory of European integration,  
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arguing for  a gradual spread or ‘spillover’ from a limited number of technically dense and 
relatively politically uncontroversial sectors in which there was a recognition of  convergent,  
functional welfare-based needs  into new policy domains on the basis; first,  of the unintended 
or unanticipated external effects of earlier integration upon  these other areas of 
interdependent activity; secondly,  the instrumental behaviour of social actors and 
supranational organs in exploiting these unintended consequences; and, thirdly,  the gradual 
upgrading of common interests and transfer of political expectations and loyalties which 
flows from increasing regional entanglement. 71   Yet for all its early prominence, the 
relationship between neo-functionalism and law was,  and remains, somewhat paradoxical. 
On the one hand, neo-functionalism “has always had a particular resonance for lawyers, 
primarily because its central concept of spillover provides a useful metaphor for the 
expansionary tendencies of EU law”72 On the other hand,  attempts to construct a general 
account of law’s contribution to a neo-functional understanding of supranational development 
are conspicuous by their absence.73 In part, this may be due to the very strength of the 
metaphorical link,  the vividness of the ostensive connection between an incremental 
perspective on  legal integration and the image of a functionally evolving EU tending to  
obscure or downgrade the need for hard analysis (and so, incidentally,  feeding and enforcing  
the preconceptions of those Eurojurists who would take law’s centrality for granted). In part, 
however it is also linked to certain tensions and  silences within neo-functionalism itself, in 
particular  the ‘original sin’ of  its founding fathers in failing to consider the particular causal 
efficacy of law,74 and the more general weakness of neo-functionalism in failing to provide  a 
compelling explanatory account - as opposed to a suggestive description and symptomatic 
overview - of the dynamics of integration of which that early failing was  indicative. 
Accordingly, where neo-functional tools have been used to analyze the law, they have tended 
to focus on just those areas where the analogy between the general tenor of neo-functional 
theory and the effects of the workings  of the law is most suggestive, as in those studies of the 
role of the Court of Justice that have stressed its importance as  a strategic institutional actor 
at the supranational level  with a discrete interest in encouraging integration, as well as its  
capacity to present politically significant  developments in a technically specialist and 
apparently uncontroversial  language.75 
Yet for all the absence of a more encompassing grasp of the role of law in integration 
in this strain of research, the importance of its emphasis upon  the judicial seat of European 
law-making in expressing, and perhaps in promoting the integrity of European law as an 
autonomous legal order is undeniable.  A related body of work in which the contribution of 
Joseph Weiler is particularly prominent, has also  set the  contribution of the ECJ, and indeed 
the more general  juridification of the EU, in a strategic political context, but in so doing has 
placed greater stress on the shifting dynamics of interaction between legal and political  
processes and the contingency of law’s accomplishment. Insisting upon “the dual character of 
supranationalism,” 76  Weiler  argued that the early prominence of legal or normative 
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supranationalism and the intrepid contribution of the ECJ to this was  possible and explicable 
precisely because decisional or political supranationalism remained largely undeveloped, with 
the member states retaining a key de jure  or de facto veto power in many areas of European 
policy-making.  The sub-text of  legal development, in other words, was its capacity to 
consolidate positive-sum intergovernmental bargains without threatening key national 
political prerogatives.  
While some   pursuing a  similarly contextual approach have developed Weiler’s 
insight into the ‘necessary cunning’ of the judicial branch by drawing upon  constitutional 
process theory77  or  institutional choice theory78  to indicate how the Court sought in a 
democratically-sensitive manner  to correct for national representational deficiencies or to 
relieve  supranational decision-making gridlock amidst the complexly overlapping demoi and 
institutional possibilities of transnational politics, and others, by contrast,  have questioned 
how necessary or proportionate the Court’s early cunning actually was,79  recent years have 
witnessed an important change in the terms of trade between judicial and political branches 
that none can ignore. As Weiler argued, with the advent of the 1986 Single European Act and 
the spread, much accelerated  in the 1990s by the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, of 
new competences and of majority voting, the earlier symbiosis of ‘strong’ legal 
supranationalism and ‘weak’ political supranationalism no longer held.  Instead of providing 
a  device for relieving or compensating for political gridlock, Europe’s robust legal 
machinery now offered a (for some)  dangerously or (for others) promisingly permissive 
framework for the deepening and widening of supranational  authority by a newly 
empowered and re-invigorated European political class.  
Indeed,  for all their diversity of perspective, what is common to each of the 
approaches considered above is the tendency of the secular development of the EU towards a 
broader and deeper polity status to test the limits of their basic commitments and conclusions 
as to the proper role of law. Both the ordoliberal approach and the regulatory state approach 
have been criticized for drawing an artificial distinction between technical questions of 
market-making and standard-setting and politically sensitive questions of redistribution, and 
this tension becomes all the more evident as the EU takes on a greater range of  tasks whose 
effective performance  involves  the distribution of politically salient resources and risks and 
which reduces the capacity of states themselves to perform these tasks. And while this has not 
deterred those who continue to hold that a distinctive characteristic of the EU is the extent to 
which its various sectoral policy horizons depend upon the  contribution of special epistemic 
communities from seeking new and imaginative ways of combining democratic input and 
expertly informed policy output, 80  the “growing problem solving gap” 81  of an  EU 
insufficiently trusted with the capacity to resolve collective action problems that, partly on 
account of its own development, lie increasingly beyond the steering capacity of the 
individual states, is not easily gainsaid.  So also for the law-as-functional-to-integration 
scholars and  for those who focused on the once productive asymmetry of legal and political 
supranationalism,  the expanding political scope and  visibility of the EU patently challenge 
law’s earlier quiet ascendancy. 
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It is also precisely this emergent  challenge  to the various understandings of law’s 
special position that has created the paradoxical conditions for the intensity of the present 
“constitutional turn”82 in EU legal theory. Let us be clear. The constitutional turn is as event-
sensitive as any other phase or aspect of EU legal theorizing. Yet while the particular series 
of contemporary events encompassing the EU’s first  documentary constitutional moment - 
the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe of 2002-3, the signing by the member 
states of a Constitutional Treaty at Rome in October 2004 and the rocky and probably 
abortive path of subsequent ratification -  has undoubtedly had an amplifying effect, the 
tendency to conceptualize law’s European problems and opportunities in a constitutional 
frame predated these events, and will doubtless outlast them. Why is this the case, and what 
fresh theoretical insights and challenges  does the trend towards thinking in a constitutional 
register bring? 
To address the first question,  the post-Maastricht popular rebellions in the form of 
failed or close-run referendums in Denmark and France and strong political challenges 
elsewhere were but the first manifestation of a heightened public consciousness of the 
expanding EU polity beast and, on the strength of this,  an emerging political critique of its 
role and aspirations. There followed  significant new investment by the political actors and 
institutions of the EU in debates and initiatives concerning the democratic deficit,  
fundamental rights, the demarcation of competences between member states and Union, and, 
much influenced by the Enlargement project of the 90s to embrace the former Warsaw Pact 
countries,  the adequacy of  an institutional machinery designed  for a much smaller and more 
cohesive group of states  to continue to deliver an effective and responsive policy output. Yet 
in  their explicit recognition and inevitably contentious answers to the problems of polity 
legitimacy and co-ordination, these political responses can also be seen as reinforcing causes. 
Once the polity ‘genie’ had escaped from the technocratic bottle, it could not be forced back 
in, and the political move to an explicit constitutional discourse in the early years of the new 
century can be seen as a further, and perhaps definitive raising of the stakes in the 
increasingly “breathless”83 search  for a new language and modality of legitimation. 
For its part, the academic turn to constitutionally inflected modes of analysis in EU 
legal studies, and indeed the “normative turn”84 in EU studies more generally, can be seen 
both as a response to these political developments and as a symptom of the same sense of the 
EU’s having reached a historical watershed as had triggered (and has been reinforced by) the 
political developments.  Perhaps more than ever before, theorists from other disciplines, in 
particular political science and normative political theory, have joined the community of EU 
legal studies in focusing on the legal-constitutional dimension of supranationalism. In part, as 
noted, this is simply a reaction to, and an attempt to account for,  momentous events taking 
place on the political stage. In part, it amounts to a tactical  acknowledgement that not to join 
the constitutional debate and contribute in a constitutional register at a point  where it attracts 
so much attention and consumes so much energy is to risk ones views on the state and future 
of the EU being marginalized. Yet the ‘scripted’ quality of the EU referred to earlier, and the 
affinity between  this view and the idea of law, and constitutional law in particular, as both 
index and steering mechanism of polity development, is also an important factor here. If the 
EU has reached a point  where its institutional  design and guiding purposes require renewal, 
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then  the temptation of the constitutional register lies in its inheritance of a double-sided 
method of modeling85 the polity  - both an eloquent discourse for capturing  emergent trends 
and a presumptively authoritative and open-ended means to frame new possibilities.86 
But  for all that this places  constitutionalism squarely on the academic agenda,  the 
more theoretically reflective  of the new work, converging from a number of disciplines, has 
been as much if not more concerned with the second order question of the basis and terms on 
which the shift to a constitutional mode may or may not be appropriate as with the first order 
question of the ideal content of the constitutional blueprint. For  in the move to 
constitutionalism the  complex mix of problems and possibilities offered to law in the 
circumstances of insecure cultural supports, political contention over the very form and 
purpose of the EU,  and  its status as an incomplete and unprecedented social project, are 
thrown into particularly stark relief, and the question of the escapability or otherwise of law’s 
statist legacy is confronted anew  with the stakes raised higher than ever before. On the one 
hand, in a movement much influenced by the work of Jurgen Habermas, 87  many have 
emphasized the community-mobilizing potential of a constitutional process centred around 
but by no means confined to the set-piece events of the current political initiative. On this 
view, constitutionalism is the register of self-understanding in which any community – state 
or post-state -  begins to realize  itself as a community, and the constitutional document  
provides both an  anchored reminder of that self-commitment and a  series of guiding values 
and institutional forms in terms of which it may be pursued. On the other hand, however,  
whereas most are prepared to concede  an immanent and highly particular tradition of 
informal or material constitutionalism for the EU,88 some instead see in the new emphasis on 
documentary constitutionalism the crowning conceit and the terminal misapplication of a 
state-centred perspective. The symbolic power and organizing capacity of constitutionalism, 
on this view,  is  inextricably tied to its statist origins, and so offers a solution to the problems 
of supranationalism that is either too ‘thin’ or too ‘thick.’  Too ‘thin’ since to  attempt to 
transfer the constitutional approach  to the circumstances of a non-state polity may be 
doomed to quixotic failure, foundering on just the lack of cultural support, political 
agreement and social connectedness it seeks to overcome.89 Alternatively, too ‘thick’ to the 
extent that European documentary constitutionalism threatens, regardless of the diverse 
intentions of its proponents,  to endorse a central and unitarian logic and to impose a quasi-
federal template  that the developing political critique of the EU over the last 15 years – 
reaching new dramatic heights in the  ‘no” votes in the 2005 referendums on the 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands -  has denounced as an  unacceptable 
infringement on national political identity, voice  and capacity.90 To recall the question of 
authority and unity, the  enactment of a European Constitution, on this view,  may be 
ineluctably drawn towards a  one-dimensional  epistemic code that emphasizes hierarchy, 
comprehensive control and self-containment -  features inimical to a multi-level order in 
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which negotiation and mutual “constitutional tolerance”91, overlapping authority in the same 
territorial space and the interlocking normativity of different orders provide a more 
appropriate legal sensibility. 
Contained in these oppositions are the abiding dilemmas of framing a new order in 
terms of the old. It remains an open and deeply contested question whether the documentary 
constitutional idea, or indeed the discourse of constitutionalism generally, is a ladder to new 
conceptions of legal and political community or a drag on their development. Tellingly, and 
soberingly, the critical view has been more incisive and articulate in its diagnosis and 
rejection of  documentary constitutionalism’s lingering affinity towards a limiting template of 
unitary authority than in its fleshing out  in a alternative register of any of the newer visions 
of legal order and authority discussed earlier, 92  just as the affirmative perspective has 
struggled to convince that any such innovation  is possible within a constitutional register.  
What the constitutional debate confirms, then,  in its preoccupation with the past, is that  the 
theorization of the new order  is not just a problem of   limited intellectual vision, but of the 
restricted horizons set by the   “modern social  imaginary”93  on which that vision draws. 
What the same debate indicates for the  future is that the reconnection of law and high politics 
which has marked the EU’s maturing as a polity  is here to stay, and that  new theoretical 
thinking about EU law will find both its challenge and its opportunity in that intimate but 
uneasy tryst. 
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